As Bangladesh approaches national elections scheduled for February 12, 2026, the country finds itself teetering on the edge of renewed chaos. The killing of youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi on December 19, 2025, has once again ignited violent unrest, exposing deep fissures in the nation’s political fabric.
Attacks on media outlets and cultural sites, and the lynching of a Hindu worker by a mob which accused him of blasphemy underscore a worrying drift toward mob rule and extremism, threaten to derail the fragile democratic transition and leave onlookers wondering whether the interim government can still control the situation.
Just over a year after the student-led uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime in August 2024, the interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has seen frequent bouts of violent protests accompanied by rising tide of anti-India sentiment. The 2024 uprising, often hailed as Bangladesh’s “second liberation,” promised a break from Hasina’s 15-year rule which was marked by repression, electoral manipulation, and economic cronyism.
Yunus’s interim administration has stumbled in dealing with the challenges it confronted. It has been unable to stabilise the collapsing economy, check political extremism and deal with the attacks on minorities Political violence has surged. The assassination of Hadi triggered protests that descended into arson and vandalism. The offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star were torched, highlighting the current turmoil. Incidentally, both papers were critical of Hasina and supported her ouster.
The interim government has strongly condemned the violence across the country and blamed it on “a few fringe elements”. They have called on the people to honour the memory of Hadi by “rejecting and resisting violence, incitement and hatred.” The murderers of Dipu Das have been quickly arrested.
But in the past year, the government has suppressed independent media and used the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Digital Security Act to target critics. Its handling of the Awami League’s political status is almost a mirror of the manner in which the party dealt with its political opponents.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), favoured to win the elections under Khaleda Zia’s leadership and her exiled son Tarique Rahman, has accused elements of conspiring to destabilise the electoral process, while student-led groups like the National Citizen Party struggle to convert street power into votes.
Economically, the nation is reeling. Growth projections for 2025 hover around 3-4%, down sharply from pre-uprising levels, with inflation exceeding 10% eroding living standards. Political uncertainty has deterred investment, exacerbated by floods, remittances fluctuations, and global pressures.
This drift is not inevitable but symptomatic of Bangladesh’s entrenched cycle of “revenge politics.” Old rivalries between the Awami League (now barred), BNP and Islamist forces like Jamaat-e-Islami persist, compounded by emerging student factions. Without genuine reconciliation – including fair trials for past abuses and protections for minorities – the upcoming elections risk becoming another flashpoint rather than a reset.
Perhaps the biggest challenge for Bangladesh are the activities of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The organisation opposed Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and collaborated with the Pakistani military in committing atrocities and war crimes for which its leaders eventually were hanged.
The party’s core ideology is to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law, which is in direct conflict with Bangladesh’s constitutional commitment to secularism and pluralism.
The Jamaat’s desire to re-write its own sordid history of 1971 leads it to a “revenge politics” in which it forms strategic, often opportunistic, alliances to gain mainstream legitimacy. But it quickly takes to violent street movements, arson attacks and adds to the general political turmoil in pursuit of its goal. Once an ally of the BNP, the two parties are bitter rivals today.
Despite facing bans and legal challenges, Jamaat maintains significant influence through a vast network of financial institutions (like the Islami Bank of Bangladesh), educational institutes (Qawmi madrasas), and welfare organisations. These are used to disseminate its ideology, recruit members, and fund political and sometimes militant activities, effectively acting as a “parallel state”.
The Jamaat-Pakistan Army links were forged in the blood of the atrocities they committed in 1971. Today, too, the party and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, are believed to have been receiving backing from external actors like Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
These connections raise regional security concerns and contribute to instability. Since the August 2024 “revolution” as many as five major high-level Pakistani military delegations have visited Bangladesh. There are also reports that the ISI chief General Shahid Amir Afsar visited Dhaka to promote intelligence sharing. Bangladesh has reportedly expressed interest in acquiring the Sino-Pak JF-17 fighter. In late 2024, the Bangladesh interim government ordered a substantial amount of explosives and ammunition from the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. Beyond hardware, the two sides have also signed a number of training agreements for the first time since 1971.
