The Pahalgam attack highlights the dangers of proxy warfare, exposing security failures, escalating tensions, and undermining stability in both India and Pakistan
Mohammad Nafees
The terror attack in Pahalgam was no random act; it was a calculated strike that outmaneuvered both India and Pakistan—exploiting security lapses, derailing Kashmir’s tourism industry, and reigniting bilateral tensions. Political parties on both sides, often internally divided, briefly united in hostility toward their rival. The media, gripped by denials and accusations, amplified the chaos, and war hysteria emerged as the new norm. While sanity faded, instability was reborn—finding new fields to flourish in an ever-expanding proxy war economy.
Pahalgam, specifically Baisaran Valley—known as “Mini Switzerland”—is no remote outpost. It’s a top-tier tourist destination that draws thousands daily during peak season. In recent years, the Indian government promoted Kashmir tourism as a symbol of restored normalcy, investing significant political and economic capital into this narrative. Given such visibility, it is inexplicable that basic intelligence infrastructure—surveillance cameras, panic systems, robust communications—was not already standard.
The failure is even more egregious considering Pahalgam’s history of attacks, notably the Amarnath Yatra massacres of 2000–2002. The area has long been a soft target for politically or religiously motivated violence. Yet, security upgrades lagged. Even lessons from the devastating 2008 Mumbai attacks—where a lack of rapid deployment and poor inter-agency coordination proved fatal—seem to have faded from institutional memory. Despite promises of reform after Mumbai, Pahalgam’s tragedy suggests that critical lessons remain unlearned.
The argument that remoteness or terrain justifies poor preparedness collapses under scrutiny. In a region so historically sensitive and economically vital, the absence of preventive security measures reveals deep structural failures. The Pahalgam attack was not unforeseeable—it was inevitable, foretold by years of prioritising political optics over hard security realities. Some lives—if not all—might have been saved had a robust security system been in place.
The ghosts of militancy and insurgency will haunt both countries until the nations abandon the calculus of proxy warfare for the harder but necessary path of cold, collective pragmatism
With alarming ease, the terrorists operated for over 20 minutes, meticulously verifying the identities of victims, targeting only males while sparing females—a chilling new tactic. Beyond the tragic loss of life, the valley suffered financial devastation as terrified tourists fled and cancellations poured in. As the region plunges into economic crisis, one wonders what opinion the stricken people will now form of Pakistan, widely accused of orchestrating the attack.
The Pahalgam attack is part of a broader pattern of proxy violence used to destabilise regions and manipulate political agendas. The dynamics at play echo a history of volatile cross-border conflicts. In January 2024, Iran launched missile strikes into Pakistan’s Balochistan, targeting alleged Jaish al-Adl camps after an attack on Iranian guards. Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes into Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan region. Both sides teetered dangerously close to open conflict, illustrating how swiftly proxy violence can spiral out of control.
Pakistan, too, has seen the destructive power of proxy violence as its forces engage militant sanctuaries in Afghanistan. On March 18, 2024, Pakistan’s Air Force struck hideouts of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khost and Paktika after deadly attacks on Pakistani security forces. A second wave followed in April 2025 after coordinated TTP attacks killed multiple soldiers. Tensions with Kabul rose sharply but, so far, have not triggered full-scale war.
Amid this backdrop, Pakistan also faces a domestic surge in militancy and separatist insurgency. Between 2021 and April 2025, fatalities in Kashmir totaled 835, a slight decrease in recent years. In contrast, Balochistan witnessed 2,046 fatalities—more than double Kashmir’s toll—with security personnel casualties three times higher (630 vs. 142).
This uptick in violence coincides with a troubling pattern of targeted killings of individuals with alleged ties to Kashmir-focused militant groups. Among the victims were figures like Syed Khalid Raza (a former Al-Badr commander, assassinated in Karachi in 2023) and Zahoor Mistry (linked to the 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking). Such killings suggest a covert campaign to undermine Pakistan’s security, often involving cross-border operatives. Despite accusations, Islamabad has refrained from escalating matters with India, just as India denies any support for Baloch insurgents—both sides reluctant to confront the elephant in the room: their own roles in fueling proxy violence.
The message is clear: proxies are no longer isolated, rogue actors. They are deeply networked, operating across borders, and pushing states into reactive postures. Terror groups and their backers are reshaping state behavior, creating a vicious cycle of conflict, paranoia, military escalation, and diplomatic breakdown.
India’s strong reaction to the Pahalgam attack is understandable. However, pushing matters to the brink of war risks playing into the militants’ playbook. Pakistan’s Defense Minister recently acknowledged that for over three decades, Pakistan harbored militants at the behest of the United States during its proxy war with the former Soviet Union. However, those links have since been severed. Taking his statement at face value raises a critical question: could the militants now act with such coordination independently?
The hijacking of the Jaffar Express within Pakistan tells a different story. It demonstrated careful planning and management, challenging the notion that Pakistan faces only rogue, disconnected militants. While Islamabad initially pointed fingers at India, the focus soon shifted toward Afghanistan. Even after the Pahalgam attack, Vice President Ishaq Dar rushed to Kabul, seeking Taliban cooperation to restrain the TTP. The specter of external threats, often framed through the prism of historical enmity, obscures the growing domestic challenges facing both states.
Meanwhile, even before the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan was engulfed in mass protests over the Gaza crisis. Religious factions mobilised nationwide demonstrations, forcing the government into a defensive posture. Despite moderating its stance on the UN resolution, Pakistan was criticised for betraying Palestine, igniting political firestorms. This domestic turbulence, compounded by the Pahalgam attack, added another front to Pakistan’s growing crises.
The political influence of these factions became evident, forcing Islamabad to adjust its foreign policy rhetoric, aligning it closer to the religious right. As Senator Irfan Siddiqui of the PML-N accused Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi of turning Kashmir into another Gaza, it was clear that Pakistan’s domestic challenges were exacerbating its external responses.
The ideological divide between India and Pakistan makes mutual understanding almost impossible. In Pakistan, Kashmiri militants are often seen as freedom fighters, complicating any coordinated counterterrorism efforts with India. Conversely, India views its actions as legitimate defense against terrorism, often framing Baloch separatists similarly—as freedom fighters seeking independence. The distrust between the two nations extends to Afghanistan, where both sides accuse each other of supporting insurgencies on their respective borders.
The lesson of Pahalgam is clear: proxies thrive when states prioritise short-term tactical gains over long-term stability. India and Pakistan may never fully trust one another, but both lose when militants dictate the agendas. For India, this means reinforcing security measures without rushing to escalate matters; for Pakistan, it involves confronting groups that now bite the hand that once fed them. Both must confront their own roles in fueling the cycle—whether through covert support for insurgents or the politicisation of counterterrorism efforts.
Until India and Pakistan treat proxies as the common enemy, rather than tools to be wielded, their borders will remain bloody, and their people will continue to pay the price. The ghosts of militancy and insurgency will haunt both countries until the nations abandon the calculus of proxy warfare for the harder but necessary path of cold, collective pragmatism.__Courtesy The Friday Times Pakistan
