Since Pakistan’s independence, authoritarianism has frequently been a major element in its history. Several eras of military rule, as well as civilian governments with varied degrees of authoritarian inclinations, have presided over the nation. In 1947, Pakistan declared independence from British domination, but the country has since struggled with political unrest and poor governance. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the nation’s founder, died in 1948, leaving behind a leadership void. Early on, political squabbling, weak civilian governments, and the military’s sway over politics were all prominent features. When compared to the relative success of its neighbor to the east, the nation’s poor track record in politics and sluggish socioeconomic growth stand out all the more.
Even during times of civilian governance, the military has frequently exercised major influence in the background. This influence has undermined democratic institutions and standards by directly interfering with them, overthrowing elected governments, and manipulating political processes.
India has undoubtedly faced numerous difficulties, including ethno-religious strife, extreme poverty, and other difficulties, but it has managed to maintain a functional democracy with a bright economic future. Why did India prosper where Pakistan failed? Why did it turn into a totalitarian state? Why has its military not exerted direct control over its political environment?
Three things are vital. First, Pakistan experienced differing political repercussions as a result of British colonization. Second, the circumstances surrounding the 1947 division of British India and the events that occurred immediately afterward point to a number of causes for the divergent political paths of its two successor republics. Finally, Pakistan’s authoritarian political system was developed within the first ten years of its independence, and since then, we have seen numerous variations of that early prototype.
The Pakistani experience thus lends credibility to the claim that political transitions typically have their fate decided in the first few years following the overthrow of the old order. Few imperial powers were able to have such a long-lasting impact on the people who were under their rule as the British did in South Asia. The armed forces are the only Pakistani institution that has kept as much of its British roots after 76 years of independence. This is because during the colonial era, military elites continued their education at British institutions; the military was relatively isolated from the rest of society, and their members received extensive training from and exposure to their British counterparts.
The Pakistani experience thus lends credibility to the claim that political transitions typically have their fate decided in the first few years following the overthrow of the old order. Few imperial powers were able to have such a long-lasting impact on the people who were under their rule as the British did in South Asia.
The British India Army’s four main legacies are particularly important in this context. The armies of both successor governments have experienced a comparable impact from three of these factors: professionalism, ethnically focused recruitment, and support for civil authorities. The British insistence on a distinct division between the political and military spheres was the fourth, and it had a significant impact on India, but missed Pakistan.
Pakistan’s political system, in which army generals hold the ultimate power, started to take shape soon after the country gained independence. The generals are totally free to grant civilian lawmakers whatever authority they want and for how long. There are many ways to explain this result, but as I stated above, historical conditions, specifically the colonial past, the division and its effects, and the formative years after independence, were crucial in explaining the conclusion. A functioning democratic government cannot be replaced by military rule. While keeping in mind that not all praetorian regimes are equally harsh or ineffective, some are actually preferable to other forms of authoritarian rule.
Considering Pakistan’s post-independence geopolitical context, the government’s decision to give military forces preferential treatment made logical sense. Liaquat Khan said in 1948 that “the defense of the state is our foremost consideration; it dominates all other governmental activities.” But appointing General Muhammad Ayub Khan to the position of defense minister in 1954 was irrelevant and amounted to losing civilian control over the military. The situation worsened when, in response to the ongoing political instability, President Iskander Mirza—himself a Sandhurst-educated former general and defense minister—abrogated the two-year-old constitution, abolished political parties, ousted the civilian government, and appointed Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator in October 1958. Three weeks later, in the first of Pakistan’s four subsequent coups, Ayub Khan overthrew Mirza, beginning a troubled period of military government that lasted from 1958 to 1971, again from 1977 to 1988, and then from 1999 to 2008.
Chronic instability, combined with Pakistan’s incapacity to maintain control over its own borders has nearly wrecked the country. Particularly in the last two decades, Pakistan’s military leadership has failed to manage Islamic extremism and terrorist groups that have put their own state and other democracies at risk. The nation is headed towards becoming an Islamist state rather than just an Islamic one. Pakistan is currently in a precarious condition as a result of persistent authoritarianism.__Courtesy The Friday Times
